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Foreigners Beware?: Exploring the
Tension Between Saudi Arabian and
Western International Commercial
Arbitration Practices
In re Aramco Services Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing globalization in the Middle East has resulted in greater commercial
interaction between Saudi Arabia and the West.2 This, in turn, has led to a resur-
gence of international arbitration agreements between Saudi Arabian businesses
and their Western counterparts. 3 However, the strong religious undertones in
Saudi Arabian law have given rise to tension with the West, and the United States,
in particular.
In re Aramco Services is but a tiny piece in a very large puzzle. While the
opinion is short, it serves as an indication, or perhaps a reminder, of the larger
implications at work. This note will discuss these implications and what they
mean for parties to international arbitration agreements controlled by Saudi Ara-
bian law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In re Aramco Services Co. involved a contract between Aramco Services
Company (Aramco) and DynCorp International, LLC (DynCorp).4 Aramco is a
subsidiary of Saudi Aramco,5 an oil company that is now owned and operated by
the Saudi Arabian government. 6 DynCorp contracted to produce an advanced
computer system in the United States, and transported and installed it in Aramco's
Saudi Arabian facilities.7 The contract provided that Saudi Arabian law, which is
based on Shari'a, would control with regard to interpretation of the document and
performance. 9 The contract explicitly stated that the choice of law provision
1. No. 01 -09-00624-CV, 2010 WL 1241525 (Tex. App. 2010).
2. Faisal Kutty, The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 565, 565 (2006).
3. Id.
4. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *1.
5. What We Do, ARAMCO SERVICES COMPANY, https://www.aramcoservices.com/what-we-do/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
6. Our History, SAUDI ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) (follow
"Our Company" hyperlink, then follow "Our History" hyperlink).
7. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *1.
8. Shari'a is the religious-based Islamic law derived from several religious sources including the
Qur'an and the Sunna. See infra part III (A) (discussing Shari'a and the Saudi Arabian legal system).
9. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *1 ("The laws of Saudi Arabia shall control the interpretation
and the performance of this Contract and any other agreements arising out of or relating to it . . . ").
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would dictate even though the contract was entered into and significantly per-
formed in the United States.10
The issue presented to the trial court centered largely on an arbitration clause
contained in the contract." The agreement stated, in part, that any disagreements
arising from the contract would be settled using the Arbitration Regulations12 and
the Rules for Implementation of the Arbitration Regulations,1 3 both of which are
promulgated by the Saudi Arabian government. 14 The agreement also provided for
either a one or three arbitrator panel.15 The agreement gave the parties thirty days,
beginning on the day the notice of arbitration referral was received by the parties,
to choose a single arbitrator.' 6 If the parties were unable to agree upon a single
arbitrator in thirty days, each party would be given an additional thirty days to
choose their own arbitrators.' 7 Those two arbitrators would then have another
thirty days to select the third arbitrator. 8
As a supplement to the arbitration agreement, the contract referred several
times to the Arbitration Regulations (the Regulations). 9 The Regulations provide
that if the parties are unable to choose an arbitrator within the allotted time, the
"authority originally competent to hear the dispute" would choose the arbitrator, if
so requested by the party that moved for arbitration.20
Finally, the agreement referred to the Rules of Implementation (the Rules),
which contain several relevant provisions. The Rules state that arbitration must be
performed by a Saudi Arabian arbitrator or by a Muslim foreigner.21 If the issue is
to be decided by more than one arbitrator, the Rules require the arbitration panel
Chairman to be knowledgeable in both Shari'a law 22 and also the relevant Saudi
Arabian customs and commercial laws. 23 The Rules further state that Arabic shall
be the official language used throughout the arbitration and that documents or oral
submissions must be in Arabic.24 Finally, the Rules provide that the arbitrator's
10. Id. (stating that Saudi Arabian law would apply "regardless of where this Contract shall be
entered into or performed.").
11. Id. at *3.
12. Arbitration Regulations, Royal Decree No. 46, 12 Rajab 1403, A.H. (Apr. 25, 1983). For an
English translation, see Saudi Arabia: Regulations Concerning Arbitration, 22 INT'L LEG. MATERIALS
1052 (1983) [hereinafter Arbitration Regulations]. For the purposes of this note, I will cite to the Eng-
lish version.
13. Rules for the Implementation of the Saudi Arabian Arbitration Regulation, Council of Ministers
Resolution 7/2021/M, 8 Ramadan 1405 A.H. (May 27, 1985) (also published in Umm al-Qura, 10
Shawwal 1405 A.H. (June 28, 1985)). For an English translation, see Rules for the Implementation of
the Saudi Arabian Arbitration Regulation in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 17 (Jan Paulson ed., 1984) [hereinafter Arbitration Rules]. For the purposes of this note,
I will cite to the English version.




18. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *1.
19. Id. at *1-2.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id.
22. This requirement stems from the fact that Saudi Arabian law is based on the Shari'a; see id. at *4
(affidavit of Mohammed Al-Sheikh stating that the "paramount body of law in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia is the Shari'ah.").
23. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *2.
24. See the Arbitration Rules, supra note 13 at § 25.
432 [Vol. 2011
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award must be given in accordance with Shari'a law, as well as with the Rules and
Regulations mentioned above.25
DynCorp eventually brought suit against Aramco in a Texas trial court, alleg-
ing that it was the true owner of funds that Aramco had obtained from a letter of
credit which had been opened pursuant to their contract. 26 Aramco filed a motion
to compel arbitration which was granted by the court on November 13, 2008.27
Shortly after, DynCorp filed a motion seeking to arbitrate before either the Judi-
cial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS) or American Arbitration Associa-
28tion (AAA). On April 16, 2009, the trial court partly granted and partly denied
29
DynCorp's motion.
The trial court's order recognized that both parties had failed to secure an ar-
bitrator in the allotted time and that, in such a case, the Regulations require the
"authority originally responsible for looking into the case" to appoint the neces-
sary arbitrators. 30 The trial court then determined that the court itself was the au-
thority originally responsible, resting this belief on the fact that both parties had
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by making various motions
for arbitration. 31 Accordingly, the court granted the motion to arbitrate, giving the
parties until May 18, 2009 to choose their arbitrators.32 However, because it de-
termined that it did not have authority to do so, the court denied DynCorp's re-
quest that the court decide certain procedural issues with regard to the arbitra-
tion. 33
Shortly after the trial court's order, Aramco moved for reconsideration of the
order and attached the affidavit of Mohammed Al-Sheikh, a practicing Saudi Ara-
bian attorney and expert in Saudi Arabian law. 34 Mr. Al-Sheikh determined that
the "authority originally competent to hear the dispute" contemplated by the
Regulations was a Saudi Arabian court.35 Mr. Al-Sheikh's affidavit stated that
Shari'a, Saudi Arabian law, is based largely on both the Sunnah and the Holy
Qu'ran.36 These laws are stated very generally, so the deciding body is empow-
ered with considerable discretion with regard to their application. 37 Furthermore,
Saudi Arabian authorities are not bound by prior decisions, nor are these decisions
25. See the Arbitration Rules, supra note 13 at § 39.
26. Aramco, 201 OWL 1241525, at *3.
27. Id.
28. Id. Both JAMS and AAA are American organizations that offer alternative dispute resolution
services. See American Arbitration Association (AAA), www.adr.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) and
JAMS, www.jamsadr.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
29. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *4.
36. Id. The Qur'an is the Islamic Holy book, the Sunna are the recorded actions and behaviors of the
Prophet Muhammed. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
37. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *4.
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indexed in any meaningful way.38 Thus, Mr. Al-Sheikh concluded, the correct
authority was the Saudi Board of Grievances,3 9 and not a United States court.40
Despite Mr. Al-Sheikh's assertions, Aramco's motion for reconsideration was
denied and Aramco complied with the trial court's order by choosing a Muslim
arbitrator, Dr. Sherif Hassan.41 DynCorp also complied with the order by propos-
ing three arbitrators of its own, none of whom were Muslim or Saudi Arabian
42
nationals. Aramco objected to the arbitrators proposed by DynCorp, arguing that
they were unqualified to serve because the Rules and Regulations required the
arbitrators to be either Muslim foreigners or Saudi Arabian nationals. 4 On June
22, 2009, the trial court signed an order appointing Dr. Hassan, who had been
chosen by Aramco, and two of DynCorp's proposed arbitrators as the panel of
arbitrators." This effectively overruled Aramco's objections 45 and thereafter,
Aramco filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Texas Court of Appeals,
challenging the trial court's arbitration orders.46
Aramco raised two main arguments on appeal.47 First, Aramco argued that the
"authority" contemplated by the Regulations could not have been referring to the
48trial court. In support of this argument, Aramco asserted that it was necessary to
look to other Saudi law to define "authority" for the purposes of the Regulations. 49
Furthermore, Aramco argued that more deference should have been given to Mr.
Al-Sheikh's affidavit, and concluded that the Authority contemplated by the
Regulations in this case was the Saudi Board of Grievances. 50
Aramco's second argument was based on the fact that neither party had re-
quested the trial court to designate the arbitrators, and thus the trial court was
without authority to do so.5' Conversely, DynCorp asserted that the trial court was
correct in determining that it was the "authority" referred to by the regulations,
and that DynCorp had requested the trial court to designate the arbitrators when it
moved to compel arbitration.52 Additionally, DynCorp maintained that the terms
of the contract were too ambiguous and that it was improper to review the matter
under a writ of mandamus. 53 The Court of Appeals found it necessary to address
only Aramco's first argument. Siding with Aramco and Mr. Al-Sheikh, the ap-
peals court conditionally granted Aramco's petition for a writ of mandamus, hold-
ing that the proper "Authority" had to be a Saudi Arabian court.54
38. Id.
39. Nancy B. Turck, Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia, 22 INT'L LAw. 415, 416 (1988) (noting
that while the Saudi courts are allowed to hear commercial disputes, these cases are typically heard by
specialized committees, one of which is the Board of Grievances).






46. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *1.




51. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *6.
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In order to understand the dispute at hand, it is important to understand the
legal, historical, and religious contexts in which the dispute arose. Accordingly,
the first part of this section will discuss Saudi Arabian law and its major tenets.
The second section will address the development of Saudi Arabia's arbitration law
over the past several decades. The third section will outline the differences be-
tween Saudi Arabian and Western arbitration practices. The final section will then
briefly discuss recent trends in the United States with regard to Shai'a law and
individual states' movements to ban the use of foreign law.
A. Saudi Arabian Law - Shari'a and the Legal System
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is governed by Islamic law, also known as
Shari'a.5s To devout Muslims, Shari'a controls not only their personal and reli-
gious lives, but also their commercial and political dealings.56 One commentator
suggested that the hardest thing for Westerners to understand is that the separation
of church and state, considered so fundamental to the American governmental
sphere,57 simply does not exist in Saudi Arabia. Shari'a permeates all aspects of
life, both public and private.59 As such, knowledge of the role of Shari'a in both
the lives and government of the Saudi Arabian people is helpful in understanding
the development of the country's arbitration law.
Literally interpreted, Shari'a means "path to the watering-place" and refers to
the guidance and commands from God that govern man's conduct in the world. 60
It incorporates the five fundamental pillars of Islam which include (1) belief in
Allah, (2) participation in daily prayers, (3) fasting, (4) giving of alms to the poor,
and (5) pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, also known as the Hajj.6' Shari'a is
generally derived from four main sources: the Qur'an, the Sunna, the Ijma, and the
62Qiyas. The dominant and most important source of Shari'a is the Qur'an which
is thought to be the literal word of God as revealed to the prophet Muhammad.63 It
is seen by many Muslims as more than a legal code because it contains guiding
55. Sharon Brekenridge Thomas, International Arbitration: A Historical Perspective and Practice
Guide Connecting Four Emerging World Cultures: China, Mexico, Nigeria, and SaudiArabia, 17 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 183, 202 (2006).
56. George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 905, 906 (2003).
57. Wendi L. Kellington, God and the Land: Thoughts About Land Use Controls and Religious
Freedom in the American Legal System, 2 ALB. Gov'T. L. REV. 537, 541-42 (2009) ("It cannot be
disputed that the separation of church and state was a fundamental rationale for the formation of the
United States.").
58. Thomas, supra note 55, at 202.
59. Id.
60. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW 14 (2008).
61. Jason Morgan-Foster, A New Perspective on the Universality Debate: Reverse Moderate Relativ-
ism in the Islamic Context, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 35, 49-50 (2003).
62. RODOLPHE J.A. DE SElFE, THE SHAR'IA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISLAM 25 (1994).
The Qur'an is the Islamic Holy book, the Sunna are the recorded actions and behaviors of the Prophet
Muhammed, the Ijma are the recorded opinions of Muslim scholars on the Qur'an and the Sunna, and
Qiyas is more of an Islamic legal doctrine. See Thomas, supra note 55, at 205.
63. See Thomas, supra note 55, at 205.
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principles for both legal and non-legal matters, and is considered superior to any
man-made law.A The second most important authority is the Sunna, which con-
sists of Muhammad's interpretation of the Qur'an through his words, action, and
even his silence.6 5 The Ijma are essentially matters or interpretations on which
most Islamic scholars agree 66 which have been carefully documented by various
67
scholars over time. The Qiyas, on the other hand, is more of an analytical tool or
legal doctrine which is used to apply the logic or interpretation of one case to
another similar case.6 8
There are also four main schools of thought used in interpreting Islamic law.6 9
They are the Hanifa, Maliki, Shafi'I, and Hanabali. 70 Saudi Arabia officially
adopted the Hanabali School in 1928.7 1 For the present, it is sufficient to note that
Hanabali requires the strictest interpretation of Islamic law and has traditionally
shunned Western influence.72
Saudi Arabia is considered the birthplace of Shari'a and is home to Mecca
and Medina, both of which are considered holy ground by Shari'a followers.73 The
country itself is controlled by a monarch who, in turn, has a Council of Ministers
(Council) to assist him in performing his duties.74 Both the Council and the King
are bound by Shari'a law.7 5 The government also has a Board of Grievances
(Board) which, among other things, maintains jurisdiction over all disputes in-
volving the government and all commercial disputes.7 6
B. The Development of Arbitration in Saudi Arabia
Arbitration existed in the Middle East before the emergence of Islam,7 7 with
one of the earliest recorded arbitration proceedings dating back to the Seventh
Century. Even the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad approved of the use of
arbitration to settle disputes. 79 While the practice of arbitration has been widely
accepted in Saudi Arabia for many years, it gained notoriety throughout the latter
64. MAWIL IZZI DIEN, ISLAMIC LAW: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE 37 (2004).
65. Id. at 38.
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id. at 51.
69. Kristen Roy, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy
Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards? 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 920, 945
(1995).
70. Id. The four schools are each named after their founding jurist and differ primarily in their em-
phasis on either the Qur'an or Sunna, as well as their analogical reasoning. However, these differences
are often very slight so they are not seen as fundamental. See De Seife, supra note 62, at 35-38.
71. Turck, supra note 39, at 415.
72. Roy, supra note 69, at 946.
73. Thomas, supra note 55, at 202.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id. at 204.
77. Andrew Smolik, Comment, The Effect of Shari'a on the Dispute Resolution Process Set Forth in
the Washington Convention, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 151, 157 (2010).
78. Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, Note and Comment, International Arbitration and the
Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 643 (2003).
79. Smolik, supra note 77, at 158; See also THlE HOLY QUR'AN 4:35.
436 [Vol. 2011
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half of the 20th Century. This led to profound changes in Saudi Arabia's arbitra-
tion laws. This time period in Saudi Arabia's arbitration history is typically dis-
cussed in three phases.80
The first phase in the development of Saudi Arabian arbitration law began in
the mid-1940s, around the end of World War II, and lasted until the 1970s.8' This
phase was characterized by a devaluation of Islamic law by Western law through
the arbitration of oil disputes.82 Prior to the 1970s, Saudi Arabia granted several
long-term oil concessions to foreign oil companies, giving them full access and
control over the country's petroleum for several years.83 The typical concession
agreement contained an arbitration provision which mandated arbitration of all
disputes arising from the agreement.84 The arbitrations that followed led to the
"elevation" of Western principles at the expense of Islamic law.85
The "last straw" with regard to these oil arbitrations is considered to be the
1963 arbitration of Saudi Arabia v. Aramco.86 At the time, the Saudi Arabian oil
industry was dominated by American oil companies, including the Arabian
American Oil Company (Aramco). After a dispute erupted between the Saudi
Arabian government and Aramco, the case went to arbitration. The panel de-
cided in favor of Aramco, holding that because Aramco's rights could not be ade-
quately secured by Saudi Arabian law, the Saudi laws "had to be interpreted or
supplemented by the general principles of law, by the custom and practice in the
oil business and by notions of pure jurisprudence."89 Outraged by the decision, the
Council of Ministers passed Resolution No. 58, which forbade the use of arbitra-
tion by Saudi government agencies.9 1 This, and similar decisions,92 have framed
the arbitration law in Saudi Arabia and have led to a distrust in international arbi-
tration with the West.93
The second phase extended from the 1970s to the earlyl980s, and was char-
acterized by a rejection and repudiation of the long-term oil concessions that had
been granted to foreign oil industries.94 It also included rejection of the arbitration
80. See Kutty, supra note 2, at 590-93; Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 643; Smolik, supra note
77, at 158-60.
81. Kutty, supra note 2, at 591.
82. Id.
83. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 643-44; see also Kutty, supra note 2, at 591.
84. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 644.
85. Id.
86. Smolik, supra note 77, at 159 & n.120.
87. Remember that the Saudi Arabian government did not regain control of the oil industry until
1980, later establishing the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco). See Our History, SAUDI
ARAMCO, http://www.saudiaramco.coml (last visited July 16, 2011) (follow "Our Company" hyper-
link; then follow "Find out more" hyperlink; then follow the "Our History" hyperlink).
88. Smolik, supra note 77, at 159.
89. Id. at 159-60. (citations and quotations omitted).
90. See Thomas, supra note 55 at 202-03. (The Council of Ministers "assists the King in the per-
formance of his duties . . . and has final authority for the nation's financial, executive, and administra-
tive affairs. . . ").
91. Kutty, supra note 2, at 592.
92. See Smolik, supra note 77, at 158-59 (discussing other cases that have shaped Saudi Arabia's
view towards Western arbitration).
93. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 644-45.
94. Id. at 645-46.
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agreements contained in the Western contracts.9 5 At this time, Saudi Arabia, along
with several other Middle Eastern states, had no arbitration legislation and chose
not to participate in international arbitration. 96
Finally, the third phase emerged in the early to mid-1980s and involved a re-
surgence of international arbitration in many Middle Eastern states due to global-
ization and growth in international commerce.9 7 In Saudi Arabia, this meant the
promulgation of the Arbitration Regulations in 1983, followed by the Rules of
Implementation in 1985.98
The Regulations were created for two main purposes. 99 First, they established
a set of uniform rules for the benefit and guidance of foreign business partners
who were dissatisfied with the uncertainty of the previous system. 1 Second, they
provided for extensive governmental oversight over all aspects of the arbitration
procedures and proceedings.10 ' This supervisory power is delegated to the "Au-
thority originally competent to hear the dispute," which is the Board of Griev-
ances in any suit involving a government agency or commercial contract. 102 The
Rules and Regulations are strictly designed to assure compliance with Shari'a law
by the arbitration panel. 0 3 For example, the Rules require arbitration by Muslim
arbitrators, and also require the arbitrators to render an award that is enforceable
under Shari'a.104 As an additional guarantee, the Regulations require the Authority
to review all arbitration awards to ensure that each award is given in accordance
with the Shari'a. 0 5
Another indication of Saudi Arabia's reemergence into the world of interna-
tional arbitration was its acceptance of the New York Convention (NYC).106 The
overriding goals of the NYC are to ensure the recognition of international arbitra-
tion agreements and the enforcement of awards from foreign tribunals.107 Perhaps
due to international influence os or Saudi Arabia's own desire to modernize its
arbitration practices,'1 Saudi Arabia finally acceded to the NYC in 1994.110 The
NYC allows its signatory countries the option of refusing to recognize any foreign
arbitration award that goes against their public policy."' This has allowed Saudi
95. Id. at 646.
96. Smolik, supra note 77, at 160.
97. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 646.
98. Turck, supra note 39, at 431.
99. Sayen, supra note 56, at 912.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 912-13.
103. Id. at 916.
104. Id.
105. Sayen, supra note 56 at 916; see also Arbitration Regulations, supra note 12 at art. 20 (stating
that "the judgment of the arbiters shall be enforceable when it becomes final by the authority originally
responsible for considering the dispute . . . ").
106. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517
(1958) (hereinafter New York Convention].
107. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 647-48.
108. Problems Confronting U.S. Businesspersons in Saudi Arabia: Hearing Before the Subcommn. on
Europe and the Middle East, 102d Cong. 2-4 (1992) (statement of Sen. John Glenn, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations).
109. Roy, supra note 69, at 953.
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Arabia the ability to align itself more closely to international dispute resolution
standards without having to abandon its public policy or religious beliefs.112
C. Differences Between Western Practices, Saudi Arabian Arbitration
Laws, and Shari'a in General
There are several noteworthy differences between Western and Saudi Arabian
arbitration practices. It is important to recognize these differences in order to fully
understand the possible issues this case represents. However, this note will briefly
discuss only the differences that appear most salient.
One frequently raised issue is the fact that Shari'a does not recognize the im-
position of interest in any contract.' 13 Interest, or "Riba" as it is known in Saudi
Arabian culture, is considered to be a form of unjustified enrichment."l 4 Accord-
ingly, any contract that allows for excessive profits or interest rates will be
deemed unconscionable and unenforceable." 5 Islamic principles also prohibit any
contract clause that relies on speculation or the occurrence of an uncertain
event."l 6 The result is often smaller awards than common law courts generally
grant.'
Another issue involves the binding nature of arbitration agreements in the
West. In the United States, arbitral awards are considered final and binding, with
limited grounds for review or vacatur." 8 Unfortunately, the issue is not as simple
in Saudi Arabia. According to the Hanabali school of thought, which Saudi Arabia
follows, arbitration awards have the same binding effect as a court judgment.' 19
However, as stated above, an award does not become binding until the "authority
originally competent to hear the dispute" has reviewed it to ensure that it complies
with Shari'a.120 Furthermore, the standards for this review are uncertain and un-
predictable.121 If the award fails to satisfy the competent authority, a party may be
forced to start over from scratch, thereby wasting the time, money, and other re-
sources spent on the first arbitration proceeding.' 2
There are several other issues to be aware of, including: the prohibition of
government agency participation in arbitration without permission from the Coun-
sel of Ministries,12 3 gender and religious restrictions in arbitrator appointments,' 24
112. Id. at 953-54.
113. Kutty, supra note 2, at 604.
114. Id.
115. Roy, supra note 69, at 947 ("The law of Islam forbids Riba based on the belief that obtaining
something for nothing is inherently immoral and wrong.").
116. Until recently, the Saudi Arabian government even forbade the use of insurance contracts or
clauses, reasoning that they were based on events that were uncertain to occur. Id. at 947-48.
117. Id. at 949.
118. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 10 (2006).
119. Kutty, supra note 2, at 597-98.
120. See Sayen, supra, notes 103-105 and supporting text; see also Sayen, supra note 56, at 938-39.
121. Sayen, supra note 56, at 942.
122. Id.
123. Thomas, supra note 55, at 233.
124. Id. at 208.
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disparities between the weight that male and female testimony is given, 125 and the
fact that all proceedings and documents are to be in Arabic.126
D. Individual States' Movements to Ban the Use of Foreign Law
The mere mention of the word "Shari'a" conjures fear in the hearts of many
Westerners, who view it as oppressive and inhumane.' 27 Indeed, the United States
has recently been experiencing an increasing sense of hostility towards the use of
foreign law, Shari'a in particular. This is evidenced by the multiple states 28 that
have recently introduced anti-foreign law bills to their legislatures. While the lan-
guage varies from state to state, these bills typically specify that no court, arbitra-
tor, or other tribunal may apply foreign law if it would deprive the parties of their
constitutional rights.129 Even Texas, which has been somewhat friendly with re-
spect to the use of foreign or religious-based law in the past,' 30 has recently pro-
posed a statute banning the use of foreign law 131 and a constitutional amendment
that would forbid the use of religious or cultural law.132
While most of these proposed laws do not specify Shari'a in particular, it has
been suggested that they have been designed specifically to target and stigmatize
Shari'a law.133 The reasons behind this suggestion are numerous and controver-
sial. One justification advanced by the Tennessee legislature is the deterrence of
125. Id. at 210.
126. See Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, at § 25.
127. Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, available at nytimes.com ("No legal
system has ever had worse press. To many, the word Shariah conjures horrors of hands cut off, adul-
terers stoned and women oppressed.").
128. H.B. 88, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 201 1)(specifying Shari'a); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., Ist Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2011); S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011); H.B. 45, 151st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 520, 117th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); L.B. 647, 102nd
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011); S.B. 444, 119th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011); S.B. 201,
86th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.B. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2011) (specify-
ing Sharia law); S.B. 1029, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (proposed Tennessee law
that would the use of Shari'a); H.B. 708, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); H.RJ. Res.
31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) (Missouri bill proposing a constitutional amendment
to prohibits from applying Sharia or international law); H.B. 1552, 53rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2011); S.B. 1294, 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
129. See, e.g., S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 201 1)("Any court, arbitration tribunal, or
administrative agency ruling or decision shall violate the public policy of this state and be void and
unenforceable if the court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency bases its rulings or decisions
in the matter at issue in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal code, or system that would not grant
the parties affected by the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges
granted under the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution.").
130. See Woodlands Christian Academy v. Weibust, No. 09-10-00010-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS
8107, at *12-*18 (Tex. App. Oct. 7, 2010) (holding that an arbitration provision requiring the applica-
tion of "biblical" law was not unconscionable); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003)
(upholding an arbitration clause which required application of Islamic law); Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.
§172.102(a) (2010) ("The arbitration tribunal shall decide the dispute according to the rules of law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute.").
131. H.B. 3027, 82d Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
132. H.R.J. Res. 57, 82d Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
133. See, e.g., Stephen Largen, Legislation Tries to Bar Foreign Influence: Critics Say Bills Target
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"homegrown terrorism."' 34 In a twenty-page bill, the Tennessee legislature pro-
posed criminalizing the use of Shari'a, urging that it is inherently contrary to
American values and intimating that it was linked to the September II terrorist
attacks.' " Other noteworthy politicians have demonstrated a similar attitude.'3 6
Yet others have suggested perhaps a more benign justification, arguing that
the aim is to protect the rights of women in domestic disputes. 3 7 In the last few
years, Canada and Great Britain have been struggling to find a place for Shari'a in
their family law, both indicating concerns that women's rights in family cases
would be severely diminished.'3 8 Whatever reasons lie behind these state laws,
one thing is certain. This movement is on the rise and is sure to have an effect on
the application of Shari'a law in arbitration proceedings.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In In re Aramco Services Co., the court, which consisted of a panel of three
judges, began its analysis by outlining the standard of review for a writ of man-
damus.139 It noted that a writ of mandamus may only be granted where a trial
court "reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to clear and
prejudicial error of law and there is no adequate remedy by appeal." 40 However,
the court stated, unless the decision of the trial court was arbitrary and unreason-
able, it must give deference to the discretion of the lower court.14 The court fur-
ther stated that mandamus relief is an appropriate remedy when a lower court
wrongly selects an arbitrator.14 2
After outlining the proper standard of review and giving a brief description of
the parties' arguments, the court then moved on to discuss the rules for contract
interpretation. 143 With regard to this issue, the court first stated that arbitration
agreements are interpreted like any other contract and that a reviewing court must
examine the contract as a whole to determine the parties' true intentions." 4 As
134. S.B. 1029, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (Tennessee law criminalizing the use of
Shari'a).
135. Id.; see also Elizabeth Tenety, Sharia Law Ban Proposed in Tennessee, WASH POST, Feb. 24,
2011, available at http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/2011/02/sharia law-ban proposed
in tennessee.htmi.
136. See, e.g., Fvan MeMorris-Santoro, Gingrich Calls for Federal Ban on Shariah Law in U.S.,
WASH. POST, Sep. 18, 2010, available at http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/09/gingrich-calls-
for-federal-law-banning-shariah-law-in-us.php (quoting Newt Gingrich who advocated for a federal
ban on Shariah law in the U.S.).
137. Sally Armstrong, If There's a Place for Sharia, It's not in Ontario, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005,
available at www.nytimes.com.
138. Id.; see also Elaine Sciolino, Britain Grapples with Role for Islamic Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2008, available at www.nytimes.com.
139. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICrIONARY (3d. ed. 1969) (defining "mandamus" as a "command by
order or writ issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sover-
eign, directed to some inferior court.. requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation
of law.")
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always, the goal is to give effect to the true intentions of the parties as expressed
in the agreement.145 In order to do this, the court stated that it must look at the
agreement as a whole, and not give any single provision more effect than an-
other.146 It was further noted that when the only evidence the court is given is the
undisputed and reasonable opinion of an expert in foreign law, it will generally be
accepted as true. 147
The court then chose to discuss how issues of contract ambiguity should be
resolved. After asserting that it is a question of law which should be decided by
the court, the judges found that this determination must be made by looking at the
circumstances that were present when the contract was created.148 They stated that
a contract is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in more than one
way.149 However, if a contract can be afforded a definite interpretation, the court
should interpret it as a matter of law.150 The opinion further asserted that not every
difference or lack of clarity creates ambiguity and that the words of the contract
should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.' 5 1
After delineating the general principles regarding contact interpretation, the
court applied them to the instant case.'5 The court first noted that neither party
had requested the lower court to select the arbitrators in accordance with Article
10' of the Regulations. 154 Furthermore, even if they had, the trial court erred in
concluding that it was the authority with the power to select the arbitrators under
Article 10.' 5 In support of this holding, the court noted that Article 8 of the Regu-
lations refers to the "Secretariat," which is given authority over all notices and
summons.156 Furthermore, sections 12'5 and 25158 of the Rules both provide that
the notices and arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in Arabic.' Finally,
the court referred to the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. AI-Sheikh, which also
stated that the "Authority" referred to by the Regulations was the Saudi Arabian
courts. The court found it unnecessary to address the parties' other concerns and
arguments and directed the trial court to vacate its prior orders.
145. Id.
146. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *5.
147. Id.




152. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *6.
153. Arbitration Regulations, supra note 12 at art. 10 ("If the disputants fail to appoint the arbiters ...
the authority originally responsible for looking into the case shall appoint the necessary arbiters in
response to a request by the party who is interested in expediting the procedure ...
154. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525, at *6.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Arbitration Rules, supra note 13 at §12 ("The summons or notice shall be written in the
Arabic language. .. ").
158. Id. at § 25 ("The Arabic language shall be the official language to be used before the arbitration
panel, whether in the discussions or in correspondence. The arbitration panel and the parties may not
speak other than the Arabic language and any party who does not speak Arabic shall be accompanied
by an accredited translator, who shall sign with him the minutes of the hearing, approving the state-
ments made.").









Arbitration acts as a sort of personalized justice by allowing parties to deter-
mine, to a certain extent, how their disputes will be resolved.162 There are many
ways for parties to shape an arbitration agreement that is unique to their needs and
wants. For example, they can choose who the decision-maker will be and how
they are chosen, specify the rules of evidence and procedure to be used, and, per-
haps most important, they may choose what law they wish the arbitrators to ap-
ply.'63 When an arbitration agreement is silent as to choice of law, the law govern-
ing the arbitration will usually be the law of the jurisdiction in which the arbitra-
tion is seatcd.IM However, the parties may choose to apply another type of law to
the arbitration by including a choice of law provision.165 Indeed, because of the
differences in Islamic and Western commercial practices, Muslim parties will
often require the application of Islamic law.166 This is precisely what DynCorp
and Aramco intended to do with their arbitration agreement by requiring applica-
tion of Saudi Arabian law.
Based on the presence of the choice of law provisions in Aramco's contract
and arbitration agreement, the court was correct in applying Saudi Arabian law.
By all accounts, it also seems that the Houston Court of Appeals was correct in
concluding that the "Authority" contemplated by the Rules and the Regulations
was a Saudi Arabian judicial body,167 and that this authority has been delegated to
the Board of Grievances by Saudi Arabian law. 68 This begs us to consider what
this means for corporations, such as DynCorp, who are parties to arbitration
agreements controlled by Saudi Arabian law.
Although not explicitly required by the Rules and Regulations, the fact that
the Authority must be a Saudi Arabian judicial body may likely mean submitting
to arbitration in Saudi Arabia.169 Theoretically, the parties are free to designate
any venue they wish, as long as the arbitration is conducted in a manner consistent
with the Rules and Regulations.170 However, the practical effect of the Authority's
location in Saudi Arabia would make it very difficult to conduct the arbitration
162. MICHAEL E. SWARTZ, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 532 (2005).
163. Id.
164. PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 89-90 (2d ed.
2007).
165. Id.
166. Almas Khan, The Interaction between Shariah and International Lw in Arbitration, 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L.791, 798 (2006).
167. See L.L. Boshoff, Saudi Arabia: Arbitration vs. Litigation, I ARAB L. Q. 299, 306 (1986) (The
Saudi court is "referred to in the Arbitration Regulations as the 'Authority originally competent"');
Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, Arbitration in Saudi Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its
Implementation Rules of 1985: Part One, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 27, 28-29 (1986) (listing the five possible
authorities contemplated by the Regulations, all of which are Saudi Arabian judicial bodies); DOING
BUSINESS WITH SAUDI ARABIA 107 (Anthony Shoult ed., 3d ed. 2006).
168. Thomas, supra note 55, at 204 (the Board of Grievances has "jurisdiction over commercial
disputes and disputes with the government"); Turck, supra note 39, at 433 (although the Rules and
Regulations do not define the "competent authority," the correct authority for cases involving commer-
cial disputes, nongovernmental entities, or a government entity with permission to arbitrate is the
Board of Grievances).
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outside of that country. Furthermore, the Saudi government will not allow cer-
tain entities to designate a forum outside the country, including companies incor-
porated in Saudi Arabia or companies that are jointly owned by foreign and Saudi
investors. 172 It is true that this is not the situation faced in Aramco because both
companies were incorporated in the United States. 7 1 Still, such companies may
submit to arbitration in Saudi Arabia out of necessity or the convenience of being
closer to the adjudicatory body overseeing their arbitration.174
If, however, the parties decide on a venue outside the confines of Saudi Ara-
bia, they face yet another issue: enforcement of the award. Remember that the
New York Convention, ratified by Saudi Arabia, was designed to ensure the en-
forcement of foreign awards.' 75 The problem, however, is that the Convention
allows judicial bodies to refuse recognition of a foreign award if it goes against
their public policy.176 Some nations have interpreted this provision narrowly, find-
ing that an arbitration award can be refused only if it violates international pol-
icy. 177 However, Saudi Arabia seems to have adopted a much broader interpreta-
tion, allowing it to deny any arbitration award that does not comport with its own
national policy.' 78 This is particularly relevant here because Saudi Arabia's laws
and public policies, which are so heavily based on a strict interpretation of the
Shari'a, stand in stark contrast to those of many member states.179 For DynCorp,
this means that even if they do go to arbitration in the United States, the Board of
Grievances may refuse to recognize the award if it violates Saudi Arabian arbitra-
tion laws.
Another issue that must be confronted when applying Shari'a law to an inter-
national dispute is the constitutional and statutory conflicts that may arise.' This
is especially significant now, considering the number of states that have intro-
duced anti-foreign law or anti-Shari'a statutes in their legislatures. These laws
purport to bind any court or arbitrator within their state, as well as federal courts
sitting in diversity. Whether these anti-foreign law bills specify Shari'a or not,
they effectively ban its application because it is, after all, foreign law. This would
mean that a choice of law provision, such as the one in Aramco, would be unen-
forceable.
The question, then, is whether or not such a result is desirable. It has been
suggested that Shari'a law is nothing close to the harsh and unforgiving creature it
171. Id.; see also Yahya Al-Samaan, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of
Domestic Arbitration in Saudi Arabia, 9 ARAB L.Q. 217,232 (1994).
172. Al-Samaan, supra note 171, at 232.
173. Aramco, 2010 WL 1241525 *1 n. 3.
174. Al-Samaan, supra note 171, at 232.
175. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 647.
176. See New York Convention, supra note 106 at art. V(2)(b).
177. Brower & Sharpe, supra note 78, at 649 (arguing that the better view of the New York Conven-
tion is that it is "international, and not domestic, public policy that is at issue" and listing nations that
follow this view).
178. Kutty, supra note 2, at 603 (noting that several Islamic nations, including Saudi Arabia, have
refused to recognize foreign arbitration awards that go against domestic public policy, despite the fact
that the Convention is referring to international policy).
179. Roy, supra note 69 at 953. See also Kutty, supra note 2, at 603 ("Public order in Saudi Arabia is
determined by reference to the Shari'a.. .not just the parties involved in the dispute").
180. Almas Kahn, The Interaction Between Shariah and International Law in Arbitration, 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 791, 797-98 (2006).
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is often portrayed as.'81 Rather, it is argued that Shari'a law has historically been
quite humane, affording equality and protection in some areas that Western law
did not. 182 Additionally, Saudi Arabian corporations who are wary of doing busi-
ness with American corporations would surely feel more at ease if they were able
to operate under a law that is familiar to them. On the other hand, and as discussed
above in some detail, there are certainly some downsides of doing business under
Shari'a law. Operating under Saudi Arabian law means that American parties,
such as DynCorp, will potentially be giving up a number of procedural rights and
will also be limited in the types of remedies available to them.
The question of whether Shari'a law is really beneficial can, and perhaps
should, be considered separately from the question of whether we ought to ban its
use altogether. In other words, even if one believes that the application of Shari'a
law could be harmful to a party's procedural or substantive rights, it may still be
more beneficial to allow it. Remember that we are not talking about individuals
who are being forcibly subjected to foreign law, but about highly sophisticated
business entities entering into uniquely tailored commercial contracts and arbitra-
tion agreements. Presumably, companies such as DynCorp and Aramco are of
relatively equal bargaining power and have willingly entered into a business rela-
tionship. Without evidence to the contrary, what reason can there be for refusing
to enforce a provision which such parties bargained for?
That question has yet to be answered, but there are justifications to support
the conclusion that such choice of law provisions should be upheld. Saudi Arabia,
along with its corporations, is a valuable business partner for the United States.
Not only does Saudi Arabia possess more than twenty-five percent of the world's
petroleum reserves, but it also has the largest economy in the Gulf region. 83 Fur-
thermore, it is one of the world leaders in exports and imports, and maintains trade
relations with nearly one-hundred countries.'8 As such, it would be highly benefi-
cial for the United States to facilitate trade relations to whatever extent possible,
as opposed to stifling them.
One of the benefits of commercial arbitration is its ability to improve business
and trade relations by allowing disputes to be settled more amicably and for less
expense in terms of time and money. 85 Unfortunately, there is a real possibility
that these anti-foreign law bills will force corporations to forfeit these benefits by
precluding courts and arbitrators from applying Shari'a law. For example, remem-
ber that under Saudi Arabian law, certain entities may not enter into arbitration
agreements unless they are given special permission from the Council of Minis-
tries and Saudi Arabian law controls the arbitration agreement. It is doubtful that
the Council would give these entities permission to arbitrate if they knew the
choice of law provision would be unenforceable. Furthermore, some Saudi Ara-
181. Feldman, supra note 127.
182. Id. (Urging that Shari'a law has often protected women's property rights where Western law did
not. Also, under Shari'a law, the harshest punishment may only be sentenced for a small handful of
offenses and the evidentiary weight must be very great, whereas American law allows life sentences
for even more minor offenses, such as drug crimes).
183. Thomas, supra note 55, at 187-88.
184. Id. at 188 (Saudi Arabia is currently the world's 20th largest importer and 19th largest exporter).
185. Gabriel Taran, Towards a Sensible Rule Governing Stays Pending Appeals of Denials of Arbitra-
tion, 73 U. CHi. L. REV. 399, 400 & n. 4 (2006).
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bian corporations may wish to operate under their own law simply because it is
more familiar to them.
These state laws have obvious implications for future arbitration agreements,
but what is to become of agreements such as the one in Aramco that are already in
existence? These state laws would paralyze courts' and arbitrators' ability to give
effect to the choice of law provision. Given the recent proposals in the Texas leg-
islature to ban the use of foreign, cultural, or religious law, one must wonder if
Aramco would have been decided the same way had it arisen a year or so from
now.
Of course, there are ways to circumvent these state provisions. For example,
the parties may designate another forum that is more favorable to the terms of
their agreement. How far American parties will have to travel to find such a forum
may depend on how widespread this anti-foreign law movement becomes and
how many states choose to adopt. At its worst, this movement could effectively
cease arbitration between Saudi Arabia and American corporations unless they
agree to do business our way. At minimum, these corporations' ability to arbitrate
could be significantly hampered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Interestingly, Aramco involves two countries that are extremely stubborn with
respect to the adherence of their domestic laws: Saudi Arabia because of an ap-
parent religious mandate, and America because of its strong belief in individual
rights.186 Tensions between Saudi Arabian and Western commercial arbitration
practices have been both historic and persistent. The recently proposed bans on
foreign law throughout the states have only added to that tension. Regardless of
whether these laws are passed, they are certainly an indication of American hostil-
ity towards foreign law, Shari'a in particular. Given this negative attitude toward
foreign law, perhaps it is the Saudi Arabians who should beware.
WHITNEY HAMPTON
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